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Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process 
I. OVERVIEW 
A Maoist walk-out from government on 18 September 
2007 and mainstream political parties’ intransigence 
are threatening elections for Nepal’s Constituent Assembly 
(CA) scheduled for 22 November. Although a compromise 
to bring the Maoists back on board is possible, the 
heightened tensions add to longstanding problems 
including weak political will, poor governance and 
security, and continued claims for representation by 
marginalised groups. The Maoists could contest elections 
from outside government but polls without their 
participation would be meaningless, and they retain the 
capacity to make the country ungovernable if they oppose 
the process. Critical elements of the 2006 peace deal, 
such as security sector reform, remain to be tackled, 
while implementation and monitoring of past agreements 
have been minimal. Primary responsibility for steering 
the process lies with the mainstream parties, which need 
to demonstrate coherence, commitment and a will to 
reform their own behaviour if lasting peace is to be 
established. 
Parties have started emphasising the importance of the 
election, and increased signs of commitment from most 
have added momentum to a process which had been 
suffering from dangerous drift. At the same time, the 
formerly confident Maoists have shown increasing 
nervousness at facing the electorate. Maintaining a sense 
of purpose, especially through nationwide campaigning, 
will increase public confidence and leave less room 
for spoilers to manoeuvre. Opponents of the process, 
especially royalists alarmed at the growing republican 
consensus, are desperate to derail it but have a chance 
only if the major parties are weak and divided. 
Several armed groups have vowed to disrupt the election; 
mid-September communal violence following the killing 
of a former vigilante leader left around two dozen dead 
and illustrated how easily a fragile situation can tilt 
into dangerous unrest. More serious violence is a real risk. 
An election postponement will only reduce such dangers 
if major parties agree on urgent, substantive steps to 
address the grievances and governance failings that have 
fostered recent unrest. Failing this, further delays will 
only make solutions harder to find and invite unhelpful 
recrimination and finger-pointing. 
The November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) was never as comprehensive as its name implied, 
and it has been undermined by limited implementation 
and monitoring. Maoist discontent is partly a result of 
exaggerated expectations but has been exacerbated by 
the lack of effort on all sides to build genuine eight-party 
consensus and fulfil all parts of the peace deal. The 
mutual confidence that enabled the agreement to be 
reached had to increase to ensure its implementation; 
instead it has decreased in many areas, with parties 
unwilling to recognise their shared responsibilities to 
make it work. The ball is in the government’s court, with 
the mainstream parties needing to address reasonable 
Maoist concerns, hold firm to democratic principles and 
take sensible steps to engage CA opponents. 
The government and its constituent parties should: 
 sustain efforts to bring the Maoists back on board; 
 start nationwide electoral campaigning, on a party 
basis but also emphasising a common agenda of 
peace and constitutional change, recognising 
unambiguously that an elected assembly, not the 
appointed body some politicians have quietly 
sought, is the only way to guarantee the process’ 
legitimacy; 
 create a secure environment for free and fair polls 
by reaching cross-party consensus on security 
plans, engaging groups opposed to the polls in 
dialogue, and discussing the functioning of post-
poll government and the CA, including how to 
guarantee roles for all stakeholders; 
 develop mutually agreed mechanisms to implement 
the CPA and monitor parties’ fulfilment of their 
commitments; 
 take on security sector reform, with both short-term 
measures to boost local accountability and trust in 
the police and by moving forward discussion of 
longer-term plans, including the future of the national 
and Maoist armies; 
 deal sensibly with Maoist fighters in cantonments, 
resolving disputes over allowances and facilities 
and building on cooperation in these areas and the 
now resumed combatant verification process; and 
 tackle impunity (for example, acting on 
disappearances while starting a genuine consultation 
on broader transitional justice issues) and restore 
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trust in the judiciary (including by the Maoists 
stopping parallel people’s courts), and in institutions 
such as National Human Rights Commission. 
The international community should: 
 support the peace process and the elections, 
including by giving practical help through monitors 
and reminding all political actors, especially the 
Maoists, that obstructing progress will cost them 
international legitimacy; 
 offer development assistance only in accordance 
with the spirit of the CPA, which includes 
recognising the Maoists’ party, the CPN(M), 
as a legitimate political actor (and part of the 
government, should it rejoin) and engaging it in 
donor programs, including in security sector reform 
and political training; and 
 without raising expectations that it can resolve 
domestic political difficulties, be prepared to offer 
good offices to facilitate consensus if requested 
by the parties. 
II. ON TRACK FOR THE ELECTIONS? 
The government has consistently maintained that the 
constituent assembly elections will take place as scheduled.1 
However, a public which heard similar assurances in 
the run-up to the original June 2007 deadline has been 
understandably sceptical. The 18 September Maoist 
withdrawal from the government does not in itself make 
polls impossible but raises the likelihood of a further 
postponement or graver threats to the process. Maoist 
leaders insist they have not abandoned the peace plan but 
their new preconditions for participation (most notably the 
immediate declaration of a republic) suggest they would at 
least prefer a later date, if not to avoid elections altogether. 
The Maoists (CPN(M)) had been the most notable among 
the governing parties2 to cast doubt on the viability of the 
 
 
1 For an outline of the peace agreement and its challenges, see 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°126, Nepal’s Peace Agreement: 
Making it Work, 15 December 2006. Recent Crisis Group 
reporting on Nepal includes Asia Reports N°128, Nepal’s 
Constitutional Process, 26 February 2007; N°132, Nepal’s 
Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?, 18 May 2007 and N°136, 
Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region, 9 July 2007. 
2 The parliamentary parties that make up Seven Party Alliance 
(SPA) of mainstream parties are the Nepali Congress (NC); 
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML); 
Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi, NSP (A)); Nepali 
Congress (Democratic, NC(D)); Janamorcha Nepal; Nepal 
Workers and Peasants Party (NWPP); and United Left Front 
(ULF). Following the Maoist entry into government alongside 
polls;3 other politicians stayed on message in public 
while privately exploring options to convert the interim 
legislature into a constitution-drafting body, thus 
bypassing elections.4 Questions of poor security and 
rushed technical preparations have also dogged the run-up, 
compounded by the lengthy public holidays in October 
and November that will reduce the time to address pending 
issues.5 
The Maoist withdrawal. The four remaining Maoist 
ministers (one, Matrika Yadav, had earlier quit) resigned 
from government on 18 September following the expiry 
of their deadline for the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) to 
meet their demands. The Maoists have not pulled out 
of the interim legislature – which is not currently in 
session – or of other cross-party bodies such as the joint 
cantonment monitoring committee. Their leaders remain 
in constant touch with other party representatives, and 
dialogue has not broken down. Both sides hold out the 
hope of a deal to restore eight-party consensus; the 
Maoists could also remain out of government but still 
contest the elections from opposition. However, the 
street protests whose launch they have announced could 
turn into a campaign to obstruct the polls. 
The Maoist withdrawal was prompted by unhappiness 
with the implementation of the peace deal, pressure from 
their own cadres and a growing realisation that their 
electoral prospects may be poor. The steps they have 
taken to democratise their own behaviour and prepare 
for free and fair campaigning have been limited, and 
their own analysis has, belatedly, started to concur with 
independent estimates that they will trail the NC and UML 
when the votes are in. Negotiating for concessions 
behind closed doors may seem preferable to facing the 
likelihood of an unflattering popular verdict. If they can 
be persuaded to rejoin the SPA with a revised agreement, 
they have proposed reconvening the interim legislature 
to vote on a republic and endorse any other new 
arrangements. The amended interim constitution allows 
such a decision on a republic, if the king is seen as a 
threat to the CA, despite the parties’ initial commitment 
to defer decision to that body’s own first sitting.  
Political will. By early September political will appeared 
to be strengthening, accompanied by practical campaign 
 
 
the SPA, many press reports referred to an Eight-Party Alliance. 
However, there was no such formal alliance. 
3 See, for example, “Nov poll more certain: Prachanda”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 9 September 2007. 
4 Crisis Group interviews, politicians and diplomats, Kathmandu, 
August-September 2007. 
5 The ten-day Dasain festival falls in the second half of October 
and the slightly shorter Tihar festival in the second week of 
November. The May 2006 declaration of Nepal as a secular state 
has not affected government observance of Hindu holidays. 
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steps. Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala has repeatedly 
insisted there is no alternative to the scheduled elections.6 
His party, the Nepali Congress (NC), has adopted a 
federal republican manifesto and, despite frequently stalled 
negotiations, has put itself in a stronger position by 
reunifying with the breakaway Nepali Congress 
(Democratic), known as the NC(D) and led by former 
Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. The Communist 
Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) has long 
appeared most confident, having already finalised a policy 
platform and started canvassing voters. The Maoists, 
initially the most vocal CA advocates, have started 
retraining cadres to campaign peacefully but have also 
announced a program of strikes and street protests. 
Smaller members of the governing coalition have little 
influence but appear to be gearing up. Home Minister 
Krishna Prasad Sitaula (NC) has even suggested his party’s 
decision to abandon the monarchy could enable all eight 
parties to present a common platform.7 
Security. The fragile situation hampers a free and fair 
campaign and, should results be disputed, a stable post-
election environment. There is little law and order, and 
police morale and capacity is low. Maoist efforts have 
focused on maintaining a parallel force, primarily the 
Young Communist League (YCL); the army, excluded 
from poll security and largely confined to barracks, has 
been making contingency plans, mainly focused on an 
attempted Maoist takeover. Although the CPA ban on its 
deployment remains official policy, senior party leaders 
have started talking up the benefits of involvement.8 
Strikes and protests have disrupted daily life worst in the 
Tarai, especially its central and eastern districts. Three 
simultaneous bombings in Kathmandu on 2 September 
2007 left three dead and more than two dozen injured 
and indicated that opponents of the peace process have 
the will and capacity to resort to extreme measures.9 The 
 
 
6 “PM urges co-ordination among ministries for poll”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 9 September 2007. 
7 See “8 parties can share poll platform: Sitaula”, The Kathmandu 
Post, 8 September 2007. 
8 See, for example, “Army can be mobilised for polls: Nepal, 
Sushil”, The Himalayan Times, 11 September 2007. 
9 The bombings were carried out in three busy locations, 
Tripureshwor, Sundhara and Balaju, targeting bus stops and 
public transport. Two of the three killed were schoolgirls; many 
of the injured were students and children. Little known 
organisations, including the Tarai Army and Nepal People’s 
Army, rushed to claim responsibility but it is unlikely that tiny 
fringe groups would have the capacity for fairly sophisticated, 
coordinated attacks. Despite promising to publish a preliminary 
report on the incidents, a 6 September police press conference 
revealed only that the attacks are, unsurprisingly, believed to be 
politically motivated. See “Blasts politically motivated: police”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 7 September 2007. The army angrily 
rejected allegations that it had been involved (some newspapers 
government needs not only to guard against likely further 
incidents but also to refine plans for election-day security, 
which depend on recruiting tens of thousands of temporary 
police.10 
Governance. As peace process progress slowed, the 
government faced a further erosion of confidence and 
capacity. Despite CPA commitments, there has been no 
agreement on reestablishing local government bodies; 
the reach of government at the village level has not 
increased, and in some areas, including much of the 
Tarai, has shrunk. Service delivery has been poor or 
non-existent, with much development work suspended, 
especially in the Tarai, where many remaining civil 
servants have been intimidated into fleeing. 
Technical preparations. Nepal has a good track record of 
parliamentary elections but the CA exercise will be more 
complicated than past polls. Apart from the political and 
security issues, the mixed electoral system presents new 
challenges to administrators and voters. There will be 
twin ballot papers: one each for first-past-the-post and 
proportional contests.11 Collecting and counting all votes 
will, even without other problems, probably take up to ten 
days.12 Moreover, the complex rules designed to ensure 
representation of the marginalised, including women, 
 
 
had implied that a seriously injured soldier, Chaturman Nepali, 
had been carrying one of the bombs as it detonated). “Army 
objects to media reports on Sunday blast”, The Kathmandu Post, 
7 September 2007. 
10 Prachanda said the government should deploy the Young 
Communist League (YCL) along with the Armed Police Force 
(APF) to maintain law and order during CA polls, “Use YCL for 
poll security: Prachanda”, The Kathmandu Post, 17 July 2007; 
“Maoists want to deploy PLA for CA elections”, The Kathmandu 
Post, 3 September 2007; some called for army deployment. 
Lawmakers advised the government to hold the CA polls on the 
rescheduled date of 22 November even if the army had to be used 
for security. “MPs suggest mobilising army, PLA for elections”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 31 August 2007. Speaking at the 
concluding ceremony of a Nepal Army coordination meeting, 
Chief of Army Staff Katuwal directed all divisional heads to 
remain alert for deployment if the government issues such an 
order. “Stay alert for poll: NA Chief”, The Kathmandu Post, 
8 September 2007; “Army offers help for CA poll”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 10 September 2007. 
11 The system agreed in the interim constitution allowed for 240 
members elected in single-member constituencies (requiring a 
redrawing of and increase in the 205 constituencies of the last 
House of Representatives), 240 elected by nationwide, party-
based proportional representation, and seventeen members 
appointed by political consensus. Subsequent deals with under-
represented groups may mean more appointees will be necessary, 
for example to meet the commitment that every one of Nepal’s 
59 recognised ethnic communities has at least one CA delegate. 
12 Crisis Group interviews, electoral experts, Kathmandu, August-
September 2007. 
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Dalits13 and ethnic groups, will make perfect 
implementation hard. Parties have to submit candidate 
lists for the proportional vote in advance but they will 
not be ranked, and once results are in, the final allocation 
of seats will be shaped by the need to fulfil guarantees 
for ethnic and regional representation.14  
The mixed system, already a delicate and in places 
ambiguous compromise when enshrined in the interim 
constitution,15 has undergone several revisions in the 
electoral legislation and in response to community demands. 
Delivering on the deals that have been reached will require 
bargaining within parties and a degree of consensus 
between them. Against a background of political confusion, 
the determination of the Election Commission to ensure 
technical preparations are in hand and pressure parties to 
stick to the timetable has stood out.16 Chief Election 
Commissioner Bhoj Raj Pokharel and his colleagues 
have made clear they intend to run a tight ship, including 
by rigorously enforcing the electoral code of conduct.17 
III. PARTIES AND POLICIES 
The behaviour of all parties has been characterised by 
suspicion, partisan interest, lack of faith in the electorate 
 
 
13 “Dalit” is the term preferred by “untouchables”, who are at the 
bottom of the traditional caste hierarchy, to describe themselves. 
14 Candidates included in the closed party lists are barred from 
also standing for seats awarded to the individual who polls the 
most votes in a constituency, so-called first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
seats. The electoral law specifies that lists must ensure 
proportional representation of marginalised groups. To 
accommodate seats promised to ethnic groups (and perhaps other 
communities still pressing demands) in deals concluded after 
the electoral act was passed, parties may agree to a further 
quota of appointed members to be selected after the polls. 
15 The interim constitution was promulgated on 15 January 2007; 
for an analysis of the electoral system it adopted see Crisis Group 
Report, Nepal’s Constitutional Process, op. cit. 
16 The Election Commission has been working on several fronts: 
finalising the registration of parties and the design of ballot 
papers; managing voter education programs (including training, 
information events such as a mock election in Pharping, Lalitpur 
district, on 21 July to test the system and voters’ understanding 
of it); authorising national organisations to engage in electoral 
monitoring; and coordinating with international monitors and 
donors. 
17 The Election Commission published the code of conduct, 
which applies to political parties, their candidates, electoral 
officials and the media, on 19 August 2007. It sets campaign 
expenditure limits for candidates, bans opinion polls from the 
opening of candidate registration until the completion of 
the polls and restricts mass meetings and rallies to the hours 
between 7am and 7pm. Available at www.election-commission. 
org.np. 
and distrust of consultation, extending to closed-door 
decision-making by leaderships and elites. The peace 
process has done little to address these problems, and 
even its many successes have hardly translated into 
popular approval or increased mutual confidence. The 
weakness in forging eight-party consensus has been 
exacerbated by poor discipline within most parties, with 
individual politicians making provocative statements and 
pursuing personal agendas in public. Civil society groups, 
which played a crucial role in the campaign against royal 
rule, have suffered from splits and personality clashes. 
The governing parties have hinted at extending cooperation 
and consensus-based decision-making after the elections, 
and some representatives have started discreet discussions 
on what this might entail.18 At a minimum, the major 
parties will probably guarantee each other’s main leaders 
an easy ride in first-past-the-post (FPTP), single-member 
constituencies. They may also address pre-poll anxieties by 
forging a common understanding on coalition government 
even if election results change the balance of power.19 
The task of keeping the process on track is far from 
straightforward. In a political arena crowded with many 
parties, electoral constituencies, politically interested 
institutions such as the palace and army, powerful 
international players (in particular, India) and debilitating 
intra-party tensions, leaders constantly have an eye 
on other actors’ positions and relationships and seek to 
retain flexibility. Policy-making, therefore, is always 
contingent, conditional and influenced by a wide array 
of variables. 
A. THE MAINSTREAM PARTIES 
Establishing a viable, reformed democratic system will be 
impossible without the mainstream parties. However, they 
have dragged their feet on many critical issues. Quick to 
lecture other institutions on the need to create a “new 
Nepal”, they have done little to question their own attitudes 
and behaviour. Despite a shift in rhetoric, especially in 
recognising the need to be more inclusive, they have not 
set a good example. Mainstream party leaders’ equivocal 
approach to the polls and peace process has had a corrosive 
effect on public confidence and political progress, giving 
 
 
18 Political analysts suggest such inconclusive discussions have 
taken place. Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, September 
2007. 
19 UML leader Madhav Nepal suggests: “We can reach an 
agreement on [seat-sharing] not only with the Maoists but also 
with the NC since we need to move together until we achieve 
our objectives. The UML has proposed that the parties should 
agree to ensure that top leaders of different parties win the 
elections. The prime minister, also, has taken this positively”. 
Interview, The Rising Nepal, 10 September 2007. 
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the impression of enjoying a return to power and being 
too comfortable to face elections. 
The democratic parties are right to see their revival in the 
face of hostile armed forces (the army-backed king 
and the Maoists) as a victory. But they have been slow to 
acknowledge that they have to build on this by helping 
the Maoists join the mainstream and persuading the army 
it will benefit from democratic control. Understandable 
partisan interests have led some leaders to revel in the 
difficulties faced by a Maoist leadership under fire from 
its less accommodating cadres; the parties’ own long-term 
interests depend on making a success of the peace process. 
This means not only forcing the Maoists to abandon 
violence, but working jointly towards a reformed 
mainstream that moves beyond the failed practices that 
cost the parties dearly in the post-1990 democratic period. 
Congress. The Nepali Congress has faced concurrent 
challenges, principally the reunification of its two wings 
and decisions on central policy issues. Lurking in the 
background is the struggle for succession when its president, 
Koirala, already in very poor health, hands over the reins 
without an agreed heir. That the NC and NC(D) would 
reunite before elections was never in serious doubt. The 
process, however, was slow and tortuous. Both are 
top-heavy, with numerous leaders demanding 
accommodation in a reunified structure. Apart from the 
personal antagonism between Koirala and Deuba, the 
latter’s designs on the succession alarm Koirala family 
loyalists and potential independent contenders. The 
reunification deal finalised on 25 September was based 
on a fine, but precarious, balancing of these factors. 
On the most sensitive policy – the monarchy – Koirala’s 
deliberately cautious approach may have paid off. 
Abandonment of the monarchy has been long enough 
delayed to leave royalists little time to challenge on 
the conservative end of the political spectrum, while still 
assuaging Maoist fears of a secret deal with the palace. 
However, opinion within the party is still divided – not 
just on republicanism, but on potentially more controversial 
issues such as federalism and secularism. Although the 
reunified party confirmed the republican line, key leaders 
remain unconvinced. The only surviving NC founding 
member, Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, played a critical role in 
reuniting the party but resigned from it on 26 September 
in protest at the abandonment of the monarchy. Whatever 
the platform position, individual CA delegates could still 
defy the party whip on votes. Meanwhile, Congress has 
yet to grasp the nettle of internal reform. The only party 
that can boast an uninterrupted commitment to multi-
party democracy, it remains one of the least democratic 
internally. 
UML. Leaders are confident their party machinery is in 
good shape: their cadres are organised, motivated and have 
greater involvement in decisions than those of other 
parties. However, concern that a mainstreamed CPN(M) 
could eat into its centre-left support base has made its 
calculation of Maoist strength critical; they will want to 
go to the polls when the Maoists are weakest, even if that 
means postponement. (The alternative approach – a “grand 
republican alliance” mooted by the Maoists or a more 
limited seat-sharing deal – looks increasingly unlikely.20) 
The frustration that pushes the UML towards a prompt 
election, however, results from its treatment as a junior 
partner in the government, often excluded from key 
decisions or overridden by the NC-Maoist combine. Even 
if polls are postponed, the UML will have come out of the 
pre-poll haggling looking more responsible and committed 
to the democratic process than its rivals and having won 
over many former doubters in the international community.  
B. THE MAOISTS 
Adjusting to the realities of their position has been hard 
for the Maoists. Leaders have had difficulty selling the 
compromises of the peace process to increasingly restive 
cadres; the cantonment of their armed forces has reduced 
their leverage and left them more vulnerable to the 
mainstream parties; and participation in government 
has brought only limited status and influence. They are 
frustrated that they are expected to transform overnight 
and fulfil every part of the peace deal, while other parties 
drag their heels on issues such as security sector reform. 
However, their own behaviour has often been the major 
obstacle. They have not dropped the idea of revolutionary 
change (although they say they want a “peaceful revolution”, 
they have not unequivocally renounced violence or 
dismantled their capacity for it), and they have retained 
the vision of parallel regimes, with separate approaches to 
security, local government and justice. Even if their 
prospects of winning power through the ballot box look 
poor, the Maoists can still make the state ungovernable – 
a threat they would prefer not to go through with but one 
which provides leverage at the negotiating table 
nonetheless. 
The Maoists are still a disciplined, motivated and 
sophisticated political movement with the potential to win 
support for what is often seen as a fresh, populist agenda. 
 
 
20 UML leader Madhav Nepal has said: “The move to create a left 
alliance may make the NC suspicious towards the intention of the 
communists. Nepali Congress may suspect that the leftist forces 
are hatching conspiracy against democracy. The issue at the 
moment is to intensify the process of consolidation of republican 
forces. Later we can discuss about the type of republican set up 
after the election….At the moment, there is no possibility of unity 
between the two parties but we can come closer and work 
together. For this, the Maoists should create atmosphere and 
act accordingly”. Ibid.  
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But bold threats of a new uprising reflect insecurity more 
than strength. The movement faces considerable internal 
tensions (as the very public criticism of the leadership line 
at policy meetings indicated) but has limited options (as 
evidenced by the conditional endorsement of the peace 
process despite the frustration). Delay in the CA elections 
has not only undermined the original plan of riding a 
wave of post-people’s movement popularity but has also 
allowed the other parties to consolidate and encroach on 
Maoist political territory. The CPN(M)’s next steps will 
be designed to counter this setback and to cement the 
movement’s unity before and beyond elections. The 
party is determined to avoid succumbing to the splits that 
have weakened other rebel movements. 
Equivocation over the polls – a flurry of contradictory 
statements has suggested indecision, even rejection – 
reflects the Maoists’ awkward position. On 20 August, 
they published 22 preconditions for participation. The 
principle demands included immediate declaration of a 
republic, establishment of a commission on involuntary 
disappearances, a roundtable conference of parties and 
civil society (including representatives of marginalised 
communities), release of all detained Maoist cadres and 
a start to security sector reform. Some of these are points 
already agreed in the CPA but not implemented (such as 
action on disappearances and security sector reform); 
others are old elements of the Maoist agenda (the 
roundtable conference) or potential bargaining positions 
designed to pressure the other parties (the immediate 
republic declaration). 
The preconditions have raised understandable questions 
about Maoist commitment to the elections. While not 
proving that the CPN(M) is trying to back out of the 
entire exercise, the withdrawal from government reflects 
both a deep-seated frustration with the process and a 
strong compulsion to play to the militant wing of the 
movement. The Maoist exit from government and 
proposed street protests will not necessarily derail the 
peace process but will further undermine the CPA, making 
it much harder to regain the political trust needed for 
progress. 
For the Maoists, a workable compromise is still possible 
if agreement can be reached on a few critical issues: a 
solid cross-party commitment to a republic (preferably 
an immediate declaration but possibly a conditional 
guarantee); movement on the future of the PLA and state 
security sector reform; and the promise of some concrete 
socio-economic reforms, such as land reform. From the 
perspective of Maoist leaders, other demands, such as the 
headline call for a fully proportional electoral system, 
are in fact less important. A return to government is not 
inconceivable, but only if it is seen as part of a wider 
restructuring (including reallocation of ministerial 
portfolios and new nominees to fill them) rather than 
a back-down and return to the status quo ante. In the 
meantime, Maoist leaders would probably be most 
happy if polls were postponed, and they had time to 
regroup and reinvigorate their political agenda, making 
the most of widespread disillusionment with the SPA’s 
record in government. This is a risky strategy: they could 
instead find themselves taking the blame for blocking 
progress and with few new achievements to mollify 
internal critics.  
C. ROYALISTS: REALISTS AND REFUSENIKS 
The NC’s decision to adopt a republican agenda makes 
the king’s position tenuous but not yet terminal. Moderate 
royalist parties – the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), led 
by Pashupati Rana, and the Rastriya Janashakti Party, led 
by former Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa – have 
lent critical support to the CA process, urging that the 
election should go ahead while cautioning that much 
remains to be done to create the proper environment.21 
Others have adopted a more aggressive line, promising to 
fight any attempt to end the monarchy and to undermine 
the state’s Hindu character. The king himself has had his 
public role further curtailed. Following the nationalisation 
of his palaces, he moved to a country retreat and has been 
prevented from appearing at religious functions over 
which he used to preside.22 For those determined to save 
the monarchy, stopping the CA election may become the 
only option. Some palace supporters are committed 
enough to use violence and loudly telegraph their desire 
to see a “democratic coup” sweep aside the eight-party 
government. 
IV. THE SHAPE OF THE PEACE 
PROCESS 
A. AN INCLUSIVE PROCESS? 
Making Nepal’s democracy more inclusive has become 
essential to the success of the peace process. This means 
increasing the participation of many groups who have 
been severely underrepresented in parties, government 
 
 
21 RPP President Pashupati Rana has said elections must go ahead 
but has criticised the government’s failure to ensure peace and 
security. “Republic before CA poll impossible: Paudel : Without 
republic, polls mere imagination: Dr Bhattarai”, The Rising 
Nepal, 8 September 2007. RJP President Surya Bahadur Thapa 
has taken a similar line. “Thapa urges parties to follow pact”, 
The Rising Nepal, 12 September 2007. 
22 For example, Prime Minister Koirala refused to give the king 
a security escort on Janmashtami, the Hindu god Krishna’s 
birthday, and took his place at the main ceremony at Patan’s 
Krishna temple on 4 September. 
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and national institutions – women, regional and ethnic 
communities, caste groups and others. Building more 
inclusive political structures is the task of the CA, but 
the need to secure representation in that body and keep 
key issues on the agenda has led to protest movements 
and demands. 
1. Tarai 
The most critical area remains the Tarai, the plains that are 
home to some half of the population.23 The way in which 
long-standing grievances of plains-origin Madhesi 
communities were allowed to fester illustrated the general 
weaknesses of the major parties’ handling of the peace 
process. Following an uprising in January-February 
2007, it took months for the government to engage in 
serious dialogue with the most significant new political 
group, the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF).24 Government 
negotiators concluded a 22-point agreement with the MJF 
on 30 August, offering measures such as compensation for 
those killed and injured in the uprising but also forcing 
the MJF to drop demands such as a fully proportional 
electoral system and to accept no increase in seats. 
The deal with the MJF suggests the possibility of a 
mainstream consensus on moving towards the election but 
has also prompted serious disagreement among Madhesi 
activists. Several MJF central committee members opposed 
the deal (as did the CPN(M), despite having a representative 
on the government delegation) and have split from party 
leader Upendra Yadav,25 while more extreme groups have 
continued violence and been joined by further small 
groups.26 Following the deal, Yadav has spoken strongly 
in favour of the polls and has mobilised supporters, 
suggesting the MJF has a degree of organisation and 
resources. However, it is unlikely to be the only new 
player in the Tarai. Senior Madhesis in the mainstream 
parties may push ahead with plans to register a new 
regional party.27 
 
 
23 For background see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Troubled 
Tarai, op. cit. 
24 Talks were also held up by the fluidity of the Tarai situation, 
with no one – including MJF leaders – sure which parties 
commanded popular support. 
25 “MPRF ‘ousts’ Chairman Yadav”, The Kathmandu Post, 3 
September 2007; “21 out of 27 central members support Yadav. 
MPRF expels Biswas, three others”, The Kathmandu Post, 7 
September 2007. 
26 The most organised and influential groups, the two factions of 
the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (JTMM), are reported to 
have suffered further splits; a handful of other groups, such as 
the Madhesi Tigers, have called strikes, held protests and carried 
out disruptive activities at a local level. On the major groups, see 
Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Troubled Tarai, op. cit. 
27 Informal discussions on forming such a party have been 
underway for several months but have been hindered by personal 
2.  Marginalised communities 
Nepal’s many ethnic groups have been pushing for 
ethnicity-based proportional representation with the 
National Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN), 
an umbrella organisation representing some six dozen 
communities, taking the lead in pressuring the government. 
It demanded interim constitution amendments to commit 
to a federal republic based on ethnic autonomy, to remove 
the ban on ethnic political parties and to end discrimination 
against indigenous languages.28 In the face of major 
parties’ inaction, it submitted formal demands to 
government negotiators on 26 February 2007, calling for 
a round-table conference “to come up with an integrated 
solution and evolve common views on the issue raised 
by indigenous nationalities, Madhesis, dalits, women and 
other agitating groups”.29  
Following a series of public protests and ten rounds of 
negotiations, a twenty-point deal was reached on 7 
August.30 The government agreed to make the 240 FPTP 
seats “proportionately representative”, guaranteed that 
all 59 indigenous groups will have at least one CA 
representative (even if groups do not have a representative 
elected from either portion of the electoral system) and 
promised to establish a State Restructuring Commission. 
Further concessions included (often unspecific) 
commitments to recognise local languages, develop 
mechanisms for wider consultation on future policies 
and adopt international standards such as the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
This deal reflects the pattern of the peace process: it was 
concluded as a private arrangement with one group 
whose representativeness is not unquestioned; many 
provisions were left deliberately vague; and there is little 
indication that it will be implemented. Indeed, the prime 
minister denied all knowledge of the agreement weeks 
 
 
and political differences between the key individuals, and by 
senior politicians’ hesitation about leaving established parties. 
Representatives of the group have approached the Election 
Commission to discuss their intention to register the new party; 
despite the passing of the registration deadline, the commission is 
likely to approve a new formation if it materialises. Crisis Group 
interviews, Kathmandu, September 2007. 
28 Press statement, NEFIN, 23 December 2006, at www.nefin. 
org.np. 
29 NEFIN also emphasised the need for a “full proportional 
representation system during the constituent assembly elections 
and a federal system of governance with the right to self-
determination based on the principle of ethnic, linguistic and 
regional distribution in the interim constitution”. Demands 
submitted to government talks team, 5 March 2007, available at 
www.nefin.org.np. 
30 An English translation of the agreement is at http://nefin.org.np/ 
content/view/231/1/. 
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after his minister had signed it. More radical agitators (such 
as the Federal Limbuwan Rajya Parishad, Khambuwan 
Rastriya Morcha and Tamsaling Autonomous Rajya 
Samiti) are still pressing for greater autonomy and 
threatening to oppose the CA process.31 Meanwhile, other 
disadvantaged groups – from Dalits to women of the Badi 
community, who have traditionally worked as sex workers 
– continue to fight for better representation.32 
3. Women 
The conflict has given more prominence to women’s 
issues but despite some organised campaigning, concrete 
achievements have been minimal.33 The immediate 
challenge is to secure better CA representation and to put 
into practice parties’ rhetorical commitment to women’s 
rights. Electoral law guarantees significantly increased 
women’s candidacies for the CA polls (one third of all 
candidates in both sections and half of those elected 
under the proportional section34) but this alone may not 
translate into action on remaining issues. Women’s 
groups and parliamentarians have been effective at joint 
campaigns on certain issues but their efforts have been 
undermined by fragmentation, political and institutional 
rivalries and (particularly in the large NGO sector) 
competition for funding. 
The prospect of increased CA representation and a changed 
balance in the interim legislature following the CPN(M)’s 
appointment of 29 women among its 73 representatives35 
have given some momentum to women campaigners, 
although most are understandably sceptical of parties’ 
will to transform structures. The conflict has changed 
perceptions of gender roles and social structures but even 
 
 
31 “Limbuwan, Khumbuwan Ready for Talks”, The Kathmandu 
Post, 6 September 2007. 
32 See, for example, “Badi women stage sit-in at ministers’ 
quarters”, Kantipur Online, 8 September 2007. 
33 For example, the Nepal Citizenship Act (2006) for the first 
time recognises maternal descent as a criterion for citizenship. 
“Citizenship through mom possible”, The Kathmandu Post, 31 
May 2006. 
34 The Constituent Assembly Members’ Election Act (2007) 
provides for women to have 50 per cent of the 240 seats from the 
proportional representation system and to make up 33 per cent 
of candidates across the board. (In effect, this means that final 
representation in the CA could be as low as some 22 per 
cent, especially if parties assign women the most unpromising 
constituencies.)  
35 There are 57 women in the interim legislature – slightly less 
than one in five of the total membership. This still compares very 
favourably with past parliaments: the lower house has never had 
more than 6 per cent women members and the upper house has 
tended to have around 5 per cent. See “Unequal Citizens: Gender, 
Caste and Ethnic Exclusion in Nepal –Summary”, DFID/World 
Bank, Kathmandu, 2006, p. 30. 
the CPN(M) – which likes to see itself as in the vanguard 
on women’s issues – has yet to grant women real decision-
making power within its own structures. Various ethnic 
and regional groups, such as Madhesi and janajati women, 
have started campaigning to ensure a high level of women's 
participation and representation in the CA elections.36 
B. PEACE OVER JUSTICE? 
The tension between the sometimes conflicting goals of 
peace and justice has not troubled the governing parties. 
Despite CPA commitments and lip-service to justice, 
political expediency has consistently taken priority. During 
the transitional period, the government’s failure to address 
a widespread lack of confidence in the judiciary and to 
tackle the legacy of impunity has harmed its legitimacy. 
There has been no progress on resolving the hundreds of 
cases of forced disappearances.37 A draft parliamentary bill 
to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission served 
political leaders’ interests by offering general amnesties but 
was universally condemned by human rights activists, who 
had not been consulted. The long-delayed appointment of 
new members to the National Human Rights Commission 
has also been criticised for breaching the Paris Principles 
on the independence of human rights watchdogs.38 
The Maoists cite a lack of faith in the judiciary as a reason 
for not disbanding their parallel justice mechanisms as 
promised in the CPA. They have maintained people’s 
courts and supplemented them with YCL cadres, who have 
detained alleged criminals. Stalling on the verification 
of cantoned combatants has meant that underage military 
recruits (who are to be identified, then discharged) have yet 
to be released and rehabilitated. Fear of Maoist action 
continues to prevent many internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) from returning to their homes. 
 
 
36 The Madhesi Women's National Assembly was held in 
Chitwan, 14-17 August 2007. 
37 The International Committee of the Red Cross estimate of 
outstanding forced disappearance cases stands at 1042. The 
CPA had committed the government and Maoists to reveal the 
whereabouts of disappeared people public within 60 days of 
its signing, a deadline that came and went with little action. On 
1 June 2007 the Supreme Court called for a commission of 
inquiry but one has yet to be established.  
38 The Paris Principles refer to the “Principles relating to the status 
and functioning of national institutions for protection and 
promotion of human rights”, endorsed by the UN General 
Assembly on 20 December 1993. They describe characteristics 
national human rights bodies must have to ensure integrity 
and independence and can be found at www.unhchr.ch. 
Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process 
Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°68, 28 September 2007 Page 9 
 
C. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 
The future of the security sector is at the heart of the peace 
deal but the army has resisted discussion of any structural 
reform, and mainstream parties have been happy to defer 
the issue. Nepal Army chief Rookmangad Katwal 
frequently reiterates his institution’s commitment to the 
democratic process but it remains autonomous, beyond any 
meaningful democratic control and deeply suspicious 
of politics from which it feels marginalised, its values 
threatened. Powerful international players, primarily India 
and the U.S., still see the army as the last defence against 
a possible Maoist takeover or collapse of government; 
their determination to guard against any immediate reforms 
has emboldened conservative commanders. 
Although the chief of army staff reports to the prime 
minister, there are virtually no democratic control 
structures. The ministry of defence, never more than a 
rubber stamp for army decisions, is without a secretary 
and, given that the prime minister has retained the portfolio, 
without any effective ministerial oversight. Funds offered 
by one donor to improve infrastructure went unused, as 
the ministry declined to raise matching contributions. The 
National Security Council exists only on paper, and the 
CPA-mandated committee on security sector reform has 
only met once. One member from a mainstream party 
spoke of resigning; only the CPN(M) was enthusiastic 
about a donor’s offer to provide technical experts to 
facilitate discussions.39 
Concerns about rushing into ill thought-out reforms are not 
fanciful. Given the political flux and weak security situation, 
there would be no benefit in destabilising the largest security 
force. Nevertheless, lack of progress on security sector 
reform, which is an integral part of a carefully balanced 
peace process, is proving a destabilising factor in itself. 
Restive Maoist fighters in the cantonments need assurance 
that their future is being secured, just as their commanders 
need reassurance that a basic understanding of the peace 
deal has not been abandoned. Equally, UNMIN’s exit 
strategy depends on a successful process. Without it, there 
can be no escape from the halfway house of “arms and 
armies management”, which would leave Maoist forces in 
limbo and, if they chose, able to reclaim their weapons and 
walk out of the camps. 
While the army has realised that it may be better off less 
closely tied to the palace, it sees the CA process (unless it 
produces a Maoist defeat) as a serious threat to its interests. 
Successful elections would leave little excuse for further 
stalling on democratic reforms – including loosening the 
generals’ lucrative grip on procurement contracts – and 
 
 
39 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Kathmandu, 
August 2007. 
increase the pressure to integrate Maoist combatants, while 
also reducing unsustainably large troop numbers. The army 
is unlikely to gamble its reputation on a risky political 
intervention but will protect its core interests. Should 
these also appear to coincide with protecting the 
monarchy, weakening the Maoists and still retaining 
international backing, many generals would be delighted 
to step forward. 
D. NEW NEPAL OR MORE OF THE SAME? 
Successful elections will only usher in the next stage of a 
difficult national transition. While all parties have adopted 
the rhetoric of “building a new Nepal”, most are wary of 
making significant changes to state structures and national 
identity. More immediately, concerns about the post-poll 
balance of power affect their positioning and bargaining 
in the run-up to the election. Apart from the risk of voters 
reducing major parties’ tally of legislators, a new distribution 
of seats could reduce rivals’ incentives to cooperate and 
leave some parties out in the cold. 
The electoral and constitutional processes both demand a 
high degree of mutual confidence among political actors 
as well as public buy-in. Trust should have been built 
following the CPA but in many areas it eroded instead; 
with the Maoist decision to quit the government it will be 
even harder to create a working atmosphere for the CA. 
Planning for the constitutional process is already weak in 
terms of accountability and monitoring mechanisms, with 
much depending on political consensus and day-to-day 
inter-party cooperation. Beyond the monarchy, discussions 
on questions such as the form and functioning of 
federalism, security sector reform, implementing secularism 
and land reform (especially in the Tarai) will all be 
sensitive and could prompt further divisions or walk-outs. 
V. THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE 
UNMIN. The UN mission has ridden out criticism from 
both the Maoists and their opponents but faces challenges 
in fulfilling its mandate as well as calls to extend its 
involvement in the political process. Even if the elections 
take place on schedule, it will almost certainly be extended, 
not least to continue the arms and armies monitoring role 
that no other body can perform. Neither India nor China is 
keen for any expansion of its responsibilities, although 
the incentive of seeing a quick, clean exit might suggest 
acceptance of a greater role in facilitating discussion of 
security sector issues. Despite public sniping (based largely 
on the perception that a sizeable budget by local standards 
is not reflected in immediate achievements), UNMIN 
has built and retained credibility with key political players. 
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With care, it can use this as leverage on areas within its 
mandate, while avoiding the parties’ efforts to set it up 
as a potential scapegoat for problems of their own making. 
However, the difficulties of trying to fulfil its mandate 
while being unable to influence the political context that 
determines its prospects of success is likely to lead to some 
reconsideration of its role. In the absence of other neutral 
third parties and with deadlock on many central political 
issues, calls for the parties to accept UN good offices in 
facilitating some discussions may well become stronger. 
India. Delhi has continued its strong support for the peace 
process. Its mounting frustration at political leaders’ 
reluctance to push for the elections led Ambassador Shiv 
Shankar Mukherjee to issue an unusually blunt public 
reminder that there is no legitimate alternative.40 A series 
of visitors, including politicians and diplomats, reinforced 
this message to some effect, despite complaints from both 
Maoists and royalists that India was throwing its weight 
around. Once the government was ready to put a deal 
on the table for the MJF, Delhi increased pressure on it and 
other Madhesi groups to join the electoral process. 
India’s role has been based on a rare domestic policy 
consensus, and critics remain on the margins (partly 
because Nepal is rarely high on the public or political 
agenda). 
However, its increasing efforts to micromanage political 
processes place it in a riskier position and threaten to 
undermine the constructive cooperation with other 
international players that facilitated the earlier stages of the 
peace process. Most external actors recognise its regional 
dominance and special relationship with Nepal but also 
expect it to justify its claims to an exclusive role by shaping 
a supportive, but not coercive, environment for Nepal’s 
people and their representatives to shape the country’s 
future. Following the 2005 royal coup, it met these demands 
well but it cannot rely solely on the credit it accrued 
then if its advice on current challenges moves beyond 
legitimate neighbourly concern without helping to 
remove roadblocks. 
Diplomats and donors. Of other players, only the U.S. 
has been both vocal and partisan. While stating support 
for the peace process, it has funded serious programs on 
security sector reform and political party training that 
exclude the CPN(M) and suggest little respect for the 
letter or spirit of the peace agreement. However, U.S. 
diplomats hint that their position is not rigid, privately 
recognising that the Maoists are not the only force 
 
 
40 The ambassador’s comments were delivered at a ceremony to 
mark India’s Independence Day. See “Indian envoy stresses the 
imperative of holding elections on time”, nepalnews.com, 15 
August 2007. 
that needs to change behaviour.41 China has, as usual, 
scrupulously backed the government of the day (not 
batting an eyelid at the inclusion of formerly shunned 
Maoists), while quietly working to increase its contacts 
and influence across the political spectrum as well as in 
commercial and cultural fields. Its calm reaction to 
the democratic transition has helped it gain in reputation 
while carefully remaining above the day-to-day fray. 
Development assistance is at the heart of most other 
international relationships, and the transition has presented 
awkward choices. Donors have been reluctant to write 
blank cheques to the government as long as delivery 
mechanisms and accountability are severely compromised. 
But most would like to use quick-impact assistance to help 
shore up the legitimacy of the political process, which is 
hard to do by bypassing government. The one area where 
there has been consensus and constructive planning is on 
election monitors. Although there will be some national 
monitoring capacity, there is widespread domestic 
consensus that a serious international presence is needed 
for a free and fair environment. Successful polls would 
move Nepal one step further along the conflict-to-peace 
continuum but not mean business as usual for development. 
Donors will need to be ready to adjust their priorities 
and practices if Nepal’s political leaders do agree on 
restructuring the state and reshaping politics. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
None of the major parties has attractive alternatives to 
sticking with the peace process, but unhappiness over 
the concessions it involves has weakened political will and 
bolstered the determination of some groups to disrupt that 
process. The Maoist walk-out from government is only 
the most visible of many underlying problems. If popular 
expectations were decisive, they would almost certainly 
ensure that elections go ahead and all parties bring 
their behaviour into line with rhetorical commitments to 
transform the national agenda. However, most political 
leaders are only responsive to public pressure when 
confronted with mass protests or violence. In the 
absence of such direct pressure, their delaying tactics 
and taste for brinkmanship, however skilfully played, keep 
the prospect of failure uncomfortably close. Some further 
delay in the CA elections may just be survivable but 
there is no viable alternative plan; other forces waiting 
in the wings – be they politically ambitious army officers, 
more belligerent Maoist commanders or a ragtag 
collection of local armed groups – would have little 
concern for democracy or peace. 
 
 
41 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, August 2007. 
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Free and fair elections would be a major boost for the 
peace process and the legitimacy of the parties. But while 
they might cap the first phase of post-conflict transition, 
their real significance would be as the starting point 
of a difficult constitutional process that will have to 
consolidate peace while reshaping national institutions 
and building long-term stability. Whether polls happen 
on schedule in November or are postponed, the need to 
address popular demands for change will not go away. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 28 September 2007
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